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VI1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, : 
v, 
DEBORAH GAYE BROWER, : Case No. 20080914-CA 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (2008). The trial court entered judgment against Appellant Deborah Brower 
for attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor offense; and 
possession of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor offense. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (2007). The judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether this Court should apply art. I, sec. 14 of the Utah Constitution to 
reject the rule in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting an officer to auto-
matically search a car upon the arrest of the occupants), and to require the State to estab-
lish probable cause and exigent circumstance to justify the warrantless search of a car. 
Standard of Review: This Court will review the issue without deference to the trial 
court. See State v. Brake* 2004 UT 95, ^  15, 103 P.3d 699. 
Preservation: Brower preserved the issue in the record at 61-67; 75-83; and 106. 
1 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of art. I, sec. 14 of the Utah Constitution is set forth in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On September 26, 2007, the State filed charges against Brower for two counts of 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony offense and a class B 
misdemeanor offense; and driving on an invalid license, a class C misdemeanor offense. 
(R. 1-3). On December 11, 2007, the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing and 
bound Brower over on the charges. (R. 36-37). On January 11, 2008, counsel for 
Brower filed a motion to suppress evidence discovered in connection with a warrantless 
search of the car Bower was driving. (R. 61-67). After additional briefing on the issue 
(see R. 73;75-83; 84-86), the trial court denied the motion in a Memorandum Decision 
attached as Addendum C. (R. 89 (dated April 1, 2008)). 
On September 5, 2008, the parties entered into a conditional plea agreement. (R. 
103-110). Brower entered a guilty (or no contest) plea for attempted possession of a 
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor offense; and possession of a controlled 
substance, a class B misdemeanor offense. (R. 103). The State dismissed the charge for 
driving with an invalid license. (R. 106). The parties agreed that Brower may appeal the 
trial court's ruling upholding the officer's search, and the parties limited the scope of the 
appeal "to state constitutional arguments (Article I, Section 14)." (Id.) 
On October 24, 2008, the trial judge sentenced Brower to suspended jail terms for 
each count and he placed her on probation for 18 months. (R. 114-15). On October 30, 
2 
Brower filed a notice of appeal. (R. 116). The appeal is timely. See Utah R. App. P. 3 
and 4 (2008). Brower is not incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 28, 2007, Officer Gray initiated a traffic stop at 4:42 a.m. after he ob-
served the driver of a black Infmiti turn without signaling. (R. 127:PH:5; 127:FMS: 10).1 
Gray approached the driver, Brower, and she told him she did not own the car. (R. 
127:PH:6). Brower provided the owner's name and contact information to the officer, 
and her own personal information. (R. 127:PH:6). Gray ran computer and warrants 
checks and discovered outstanding felony warrants for Brower's arrest. (R. 127:PH:7; 
127:FMS:11; see R. 127:PH:10 (stating the computer investigations do not "go that in 
depth" for officers); see also R. 113Presentence Report at 2 (stating Brower had an 
outstanding warrant for possession of a forged writing device and a warrant for a federal 
probation violation)). Also, he contacted the owner, Richard Cardova, and verified that 
Brower had permission to drive the car. (R. 127:PH:14-15). Cardova informed Gray that 
"he would come and pick up his vehicle." (R. 127:PH:15). 
1
 The record contains a single transcript for five separate hearings. (See R. 127). With 
each hearing, the court reporter began pagination anew. Consequently, the record at 127 
contains five pages designated as 127:1, five pages designated as 127:2, and so on. To 
avoid confusion, Brower has used initials to identify each hearing at R. 127. Specifically, 
• the preliminary hearing, dated December 11, 2007, is designated as "PH"; 
• the February 15, 2008 motion to suppress hearing is designated as "FMS"; 
• the March 28, 2008 motion to suppress hearing is designated as "MMS"; 
• the September 5, 2008 change of plea hearing is designated as "COP"; and 
• the October 24, 2008 sentencing hearing is designated as "S". 
The reference to pages from each individual hearing will include the initials. For 
example, the reference to page one of the preliminary hearing transcript will appear as 
follows: (R. 127:PH:1). Likewise, the reference to page one of the change of plea 
hearing will appear as (R. 127:COP:l), and so on. 
3 
Gray testified that at least one other officer was at the scene with him: Officer 
Kent. (R. 127:PH:12 (stating "a supervisor" also arrived); 127:FMS:12, 14 (stating Gray 
never arrests "anybody alone," he "always ha[s] backup" with him)). While Kent 
maintained security, Gray arrested Brower for the outstanding warrants. (R. 
127:FMS:11, 14). He asked her to "exit the vehicle" and he "advised her of the warrants, 
handcuffed her" hands behind her back, searched her, and placed her in the back of his 
vehicle "behind the cage." (R. 127:PH:16; 127:FMS:11-12, 14, 17). Gray then searched 
the car Brower had been driving for "[a]ny items or evidence of contraband." (R. 
127:PH:17; 127:FMS:12-13 (stating he conducted the search within three or four minutes 
of arresting Brower)). And Kent maintained scene security. (R. 127:FMS: 14-15). 
During the search, Gray found two purses in the front passenger's seat, a black 
purse and a pink purse. (See R. 127:PH: 18). Inside the black purse, he found a contact-
lens case containing a crystal-like substance and a small bag containing a green leafy 
substance. (R. 127:PH:19). Also, he found a computer and miscellaneous documents. 
He checked to see if the computer was stolen. (R. 127:PH:9, 19-21). It was not. (Id.) 
Brower informed Gray that the purses and other items belonged to "Deborah 
Moore," and Moore left them in the vehicle. (See R. 127:PH:21). Brower was not able 
to provide contact information for Moore. (R. 127:PH:21). Later she acknowledged she 
knew about the contact-lens case. (R. 127:PH:22; 127:FMS:13,16-17). However, she 
had forgotten about it. (R. 127:FMS:16-17). She told Gray it could have been in the 
purse for two years. (See R. 127:FMS:16-17). After the State filed the two counts for 
possession and the count for driving on an invalid license (R. 1-3), Brower challenged the 
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officer's warrantless search of areas inside the car. (R. 75-83). The trial court rejected 
the challenge. (R. 89). Brower is appealing the trial court's ruling. (See R. 106). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Brower is challenging an officer's warrantless search of a car. She maintains the 
search was unreasonable under art. I, sec. 14, of the Utah Constitution. At the time of the 
search, Officer Gray had removed Brower from the car, frisked her for weapons, secured 
her in handcuffs, and placed her in the back of his cruiser. In addition, another officer at 
the scene maintained security and a "visual" on Brower. Gray did not claim that the 
warrantless search was necessary to ensure officer safety or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence. In addition, he did not articulate probable cause to believe that he may find 
evidence of crime in the car, he did not claim that any delay in searching the vehicle 
would compromise an investigation or security, and he did not claim to search the car for 
evidence relating to the traffic stop or the warrants outstanding for Brower's arrest. 
Rather, Gray searched the car for contraband as a matter of routine practice. 
In analyzing the issue under the Utah Constitution, Brower has looked to historical 
evidence, case law from Utah and other states, and public policy to support that art. I, sec. 
14 affords greater protections to its citizens against warrantless searches than is afforded 
under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, under Utah law, a warrantless search may be 
upheld if the total circumstances facing the officer at the time of the search support 
probable cause and exigent circumstances. In this case, the circumstances failed to 
justify the conduct; the warrantless search was unconstitutional. Brower respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the warrantless search. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
UNDER A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, UTAH COURTS 
SHOULD REJECT BELTONIN FAVOR OF REQUIRING THE STATE TO 
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO 
JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A CAR. 
In trial court proceedings, Brower argued that Officer Gray's warrantless search of 
a car violated art. I, sec. 14 of the Utah Constitution. (See R. 75-83). According to the 
facts, Gray initiated a traffic stop early in the morning after Brower made a turn without 
signaling. (R. 127:PH:5). Gray discovered outstanding warrants against Brower. (R. 
127:PH:6-7). Officer Kent was at the scene to assist. (See R. 127:PH: 12 (stating a super-
visor was present); 127:FMS: 14-15). Gray arrested Brower, secured her in his cruiser (R. 
127;PH: 15-16), then searched the car she was driving for "evidence of contraband" (R. 
127:PH:17), while Kent maintained scene security. (R. 127:FMS:11-12, 14-15). Gray 
searched areas and items inside the car, including a black purse. (See R. 127:PH:7; 
127:FMS:13, 15). He seized two items from the purse: a contact-lens case containing a 
crystal substance and a plastic bag with a green leafy substance. (R. 127:PH:7, 19). 
After the State filed charges, Brower argued that the warrantless search of the car 
was unlawful under the state constitution because Gray lacked justification. (R. 75-83). 
She relied on historical context, case law, and public policy for her argument. (Id.) Also, 
she identified probable cause and exigent circumstances as grounds for supporting a 
warrantless search. (See R. 81-82). In response, the State claimed the search was proper 
under the rule in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), which allows an officer to 
conduct a warrantless search of a car as incident to arrest. (R. 71; 84-86). In addition, it 
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claimed that the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
Ct App. 1997), followed Belton under a state constitutional analysis. (R. 84-86). 
According to the State, Giron controlled. (Id.) The trial court agreed and rejected 
B rower's arguments under art. I, sec. 14 of the Utah Constitution. (R. 89). 
Yet Giron is not dispositive. It fails to fully address the state constitutional claims 
raised in this case. See, e.g., Giron, 943 P.2d at 1121 (refusing to accept defendant's 
argument for a separate analysis under the state constitution on the grounds that Utah law 
lacked "supporting precedential authority" for such an analysis). In addition, significant 
developments in Utah law support a separate analysis for the warrantless search of an 
automobile. 
In order to understand the developments in the law for the incident-to-arrest 
doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement, Brower has first addressed the 
federal standard, including the law in Belton. (See infra. Part A., herein). Next, Brower 
has addressed an independent approach to the warrantless search under a state 
constitutional analysis. (See infra. Part B., herein). Application of the state constitutional 
analysis in this case compels the determination that the search was unlawful. (See infra. 
Part C, herein). Finally, Brower maintains that Giron is inapplicable to the issue on 
appeal and should be rejected. (See infra. Part D., herein). 
A. THE FEDERAL STANDARD AND THE BELTON RULE. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
7 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized "c[o]ver and 
again'" that the "'mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial 
processes,' and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. 
Unites States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (internal citations and note omitted). One 
exception to the warrant requirement is a search incident to arrest. The case of Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), defines the scope of that exception under federal law. 
In Chimel, officers went to the defendant's home and arrested him for burglary 
pursuant to an arrest warrant. IdL at 753. The officers then searched "the entire three-
bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop," and they seized 
items that the prosecutor later placed in evidence at trial. IcL at 754. After conviction, 
the defendant challenged the warrantless search, and the California courts affirmed. IdL 
The United States Supreme Court granted review to determine "whether the warrantless 
search of the petitioner's entire house can be constitutionally justified as incident to that 
arrest." IdL at 755. It ruled it cannot. See, e.g., id. at 768. 
The Court considered the historical background for the phrase, "unreasonable 
searches and seizures," as set forth in the Fourth Amendment; it was derived from abuses 
felt by colonists from British officers, who searched without warrants or with general 
warrants giving blanket authority to search where they pleased. See, e.g. id. at 760-61 
8 
(citation omitted); see also State v. Debooy, 2000 UT 32, f 26, 996 P.2d 546 (recounting 
a similar history for colonists). The abuses "so alienated" colonists that it "helped speed 
the movement" for the revolution and independence. ChimeU 395 U.S. at 761. Also, the 
requirement that "'no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause5" was not a mere 
formality, but served "a crucial part." I(L (citation omitted). It ensured that a search 
warrant served "a high function." IdL (citation omitted). The Court stated the following: 
Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a 
magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield 
criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so 
that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to 
enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the 
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. 
* * * And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the 
police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that 
constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a 
showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the 
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. 
Id, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; ellipsis in original; emphasis added). 
With that as a backdrop, the Court specified that a search incident to arrest may be 
made to "remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist 
arrest or effect escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the 
arrest itself frustrated." IcL at 763. Likewise, an officer may search for "evidence on the 
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into 
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of 
course, be governed by a like rule." Id, It stated, "A gun on a table or in a drawer in 
front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed 
in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search 
9 
of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control/" le^, the area within 
which "he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." kL Based on 
that standard, the Court rejected the notion that an officer may be given automatic 
authority under the Fourth Amendment to search other rooms in the house or even "all 
the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas" in the room where the arrest took 
place. UL at 763; see also id. at 765 (stating an "unconfmed analysis" for a warrantless 
search would move the protections of the Fourth Amendment to an "evaporation point"). 
Also, it recognized that the '"recurring questions of the reasonableness of a 
search' depend upon cthe facts and circumstances - the total atmosphere of the case.'" 
Id. at 765 (citation omitted). "[T]hose facts and circumstances must be viewed in the 
light of established Fourth Amendment principles." IdL Indeed, the reasonableness 
standard requires an assessment of the officer's conduct in light of the totality of the 
circumstances. Based on those traditional principles, the Court ruled that the search in 
Chimel went "far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from within which he might 
have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence 
against him." IcL at 768. Moreover, there was "no constitutional justification, in the 
absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. The scope of the 
search was, therefore, 'unreasonable.'" Id. 
Next, in New York v. Belton* 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the United States Supreme 
Court considered the incident-to-arrest exception and the search of an automobile. In that 
context, it adopted a bright-line rule that allowed a police officer to search the passenger 
compartment of a car and the contents of any container therein, as a contemporaneous 
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incident of the arrest of the car's occupants. IcL at 460. According to the facts, Trooper 
Nicot stopped a speeding car on the New York Thruway. M at 455. When he spoke to 
the (four) occupants, he discovered that none owned the car. IcL Also, he saw an 
envelope labeled "Supergold," and he detected the odor of burnt marijuana. IcL at 455-
56. The trooper ordered the occupants out of the car and placed them under arrest. IcL at 
456. He patted each person for weapons and separated them along the Thruway, spacing 
them "so they would not be in physical touching area of each other." IcL The trooper 
then searched the passenger compartment of the car, including the envelope and zippered 
pockets of a jacket. IcL He discovered marijuana and cocaine. IcL 
In upholding the search, the United States Supreme Court stated, "when a police-
man has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
automobile," including "the contents of any containers found within the passenger com-
partment" whether opened or closed. IcL at 460-61; see also Thornton v. United States\ 
541 U.S. 615, 623-24 (2004) (applying the Belton rule to allow a search of the car even 
where the arrestee was outside the car when officers made contact). 
The Belton rule has been described as a bright-line test that gives officers 
automatic authority to search - as incident to arrest - the passenger area of a car and 
items therein, even when the arrestee has been removed from the car and secured 
elsewhere. See, e.g., David S. Rudstein, The Search of an Automobile Incident to an 
Arrest; An Analysis of New York v. Belton, 67 Marq. L.Rev. 205, 232, 261 (1984) (stating 
Belton allows the search of a car even if the arrestee is handcuffed and placed in the 
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patrol car); see also State v. Bander, 924 A.2d 38, 45 (Vt. 2007) (recognizing that 
"Professor LaFave and others have questioned" the rationale in Belton "particularly as 
studies have shown that the police almost invariably handcuff and remove arrested 
drivers from the area of the vehicle"). 
In that context, the authority to search is not subjected to the traditional case-by-
case analysis for the total circumstances facing the officer at the time of the search. See. 3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 7.1(c) at 
512-13 (4th ed. 2004) ("3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure") (stating the need for 
the case-by-case assessment is obviated by the Belton decision). Rather the search is 
permissible because the suspect was an occupant of the car prior to the arrest, and once 
the officer made the arrest, that arrest justified the officer in infringing on "any privacy 
interest the arrestee may have" had in the passenger area of the car and containers therein. 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 461; but see Chimel, 395 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that a search 
incident to arrest "chas always been considered to be a strictly limited right'" that arises 
from the necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest; also "'there must be 
something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest'") (citation omitted). 
With the Belton rule, the Supreme Court seemed to place an officer's desire to 
rummage through the interior of the car above a citizen's right to privacy as guaranteed 
by the constitution. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995) 
(rejecting the Belton rule on the grounds that the Pennsylvania court has "struck a 
different balance" by emphasizing the importance of a citizen's privacy rights under the 
state constitution, while the United States Supreme Court in Belton has "deemphasized 
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the privacy interests inherent in the Fourth Amendment"). 
Judges and academics have criticized the Belton rule because it disregards the 
founding principles of the Fourth Amendment, including the probable cause standard and 
the reasonableness standard under the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g.. State v. 
Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 955 (N.J. 1994) (recognizing that Belton "'does a disservice to the 
development of sound Fourth Amendment doctrine"') (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, The 
Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines " and "Good 
Faith" 43 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 307, 325 (1982)); id at 962 (stating Belton does not require 
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime). 
Courts have ruled that it fails to consider whether the officer was justified by 
exigent circumstances to engage in the warrantless conduct. In Pennsylvania, the court 
stated, "Merely arresting someone does not give police carte blanche to search any 
property belonging to the arrestee. Certainly, a police officer may search the arrestee's 
person and the area in which the person is detained in order to prevent the arrestee from 
obtaining weapons or destroying evidence, but otherwise, absent an exigency, the arres-
tee's privacy interests remain intact as against a warrantless search." White, 669 A.2d at 
902 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original) (rejecting the Belton rule); see also State v. 
Harnisch, 931 P.2d 1359, 1365-66 (Nev. 1997) (stating the incident-to-arrest exception 
evolved from the need to disarm a suspect and prevent the destruction of evidence; 
consequently, where the suspect is in custody and away from the vehicle, the exception 
does not apply); Bauder, 924 A.2d at 45 (stating "an arrestee who has been secured away 
from the vehicle is in no position to seize a weapon or evidence from its interior"). 
13 
In addition, judges and academics have recognized that the Belton bright-line rule 
is susceptible to abuse and invites mischief. See, e.g., 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, § 7.1(c) at 527 (stating Belton creates the risk that police will make custodial 
arrests - where they otherwise would not - in order to conduct a search); Thornton, 541 
U.S. at 624 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (stating "lower court decisions seem now 
to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police 
entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel.... That 
erosion is a direct consequence of Belton's shaky foundation"); Pierce, 642 A.2d at 961 
(stating the Belton rule "as applied to arrests for traffic offenses, creates an unwarranted 
incentive for police to cmake custodial arrests'" as a pretext for a warrantless search); 
Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 374 (Nev. 2003) (stating "[p]olice might even be tempted 
to arrest a person simply to conduct a warrantless search of that person's vehicle"). 
Given the criticism surrounding the Belton rule, several jurisdictions have declined 
to follow it. See State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 138L 1385 (La. 1982) (stating Belton is 
distinguishable and therefore inapplicable; and ruling that Belton is not a correct rule 
"under our State Constitution"); Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264, 1267-68 
(Mass. 1983) (limiting the incident-to-arrest exception); Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 
373-74 (Nev. 2003) (rejecting Belton)', State v. Eckel, 888 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 2006) 
(same); State v. Rowell, 188 P.3d 95, 99-100 (N.M. 2008) (declining to follow Belton)', 
Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995) (rejecting Belton)', People v. 
Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 64-65 (N.Y. 1989) (recognizing dissatisfaction with Belton)', State 
v. Kirsch, 686 P.2d 446, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (stating "Belton is not the law of 
14 
Oregon"); State v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 46-47 (Vt. 2007) (rejecting Beltori): Holman v. 
State, 183 P.3d 368, 371 (Wyo. 2008) (same). 
Utah should definitively join those jurisdictions that have rejected the Belton test. 
It should adopt a separate analysis under the state constitution for assessing the warrant-
less search of a car after the occupant has been arrested and secured. Such an analysis 
should parallel the approach in ChimeU and conform to the traditional principles that have 
shaped the reasonableness standard under search-and-seizure jurisprudence. In that 
regard, the state constitutional analysis should rely on a case-by-case assessment of the 
total circumstances facing the officer at the time of the search, and the warrantless search 
should be defined and limited by the circumstances supporting the justification. See, e.g. 
ChimeU 395 U.S. at 765 (stating the "'recurring questions'" of "'reasonableness'" in the 
search-and-seizure context depend on "'the facts and circumstances - the total 
atmosphere of the case'") (citation omitted). Likewise, it should rely on the probable-
cause standard and a showing of exigent circumstances in the form of a threat to officer 
safety or the destruction of evidence. See, e.g., id. at 759 (recognizing that a warrantless 
search under the incident-to-arrest exception is strictly limited, and '"grows out of" an 
inherent necessity at the time of the arrest; also, '"there must be something more in the 
way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest'") (citation omitted). More specifically, the 
state constitutional analysis should prohibit the automatic search of the interior of a car 
and containers therein once officers have arrested the occupants and secured them - since 
under those circumstances the warrantless search would lack reasonable justification. 
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B. UTAH LAW SUPPORTS AN INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL ANALYSIS FOR THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A CAR. 
In recent years, the Utah Supreme Court has urged litigants to adequately preserve 
and raise state constitutional claims. £ee? Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, f 14, 122 
P.3d 506 (recognizing that Utah courts are the "guardians of the individual liberties]" of 
the citizens of this state), reVd on other grounds, 547 U.S. 398 (2006); see also State v. 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f^ 14, 164 P.3d 397 (stating the court would welcome "an analysis 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution"). Likewise, it has signaled that the 
debate for a state constitutional analysis under art. I, sec. 14 should be pursued. See e.g. 
Brizham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, fflf 13-14; see also Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 16 n. 2 
(inviting debate on the merits "of whether and when to depart from federal Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and chart our own course in the realm of search and seizure law 
based on the protections afforded by article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution") 
(citing State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1234-37 (Utah 1996); State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990)); State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ^ 32, 996 P.2d 546 (stating 
"[i]t is 'the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the most valued 
by civilized men'[—] that demands an independent and proper judicial determination") 
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
To that end, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a party is not required to 
follow a particular formula in framing and raising a state constitutional issue. See^ State v. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ffi[ 33 & 37, 162 P.3d 1106. The court has "on numerous 
occasions cited with favor the traditional methods of [state] constitutional analysis" and 
looked to the language of the constitutional provision, as well as to historical evidence, 
law from other states, and policy arguments. IdL at f^ 37. However, "[i]n theory, a 
claimant could rely on nothing more than plain language to make an argument for a 
construction of a Utah provision that would be different from the interpretation the 
federal courts have given similar language." IcL 
In this case, Brower has relied on the text of art. I, sec. 14; historical evidence; 
developing law in Utah and other jurisdictions; and policy arguments to support a state 
constitutional analysis that reflects a departure from the Belton bright-line rule. (See 
infra, Parts B.(l), B.(2), and B.(3), herein). Brower has argued that the Utah Constitution 
affords greater protections to its citizens against warrantless searches than is afforded 
under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, art. I, sec. 14 should be construed to protect Utah's 
citizens from warrantless automobile searches except when probable cause and exigent 
circumstances support the intrusion. 
(1) The Text of Art. I, Sec. 14, and Utah's History Support an Interpretation of the 
State Provision that Gives Greater Protections to Utah's Citizens. 
Just as the United States Supreme Court considered abusive search-and-seizure 
practices to shape the attitudes of early settlers in drafting the federal Bill of Rights, see 
Chimej 395 U.S. at 760-61, the Utah Supreme Court has considered the same with regard 
to Utah's Declaration of Rights. See, e.g., DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, j^ 26. Years after the 
Fourth Amendment was enacted, federal marshals subjected Utah settlers to their own 
abusive practices with general warrants and warrantless raids. See_ DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, 
[^ 26; Kenneth R. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under 
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the Utah Constitution, Article I Section 14, 17 J. Contemp. L. 267, 276-77, 279 (1991) 
("Wallentine, Heeding the Call") (recounting deprivations suffered by pioneers at the 
hands of federal marshals; also stating that early drafters of the Utah Constitution were 
"acutely concerned with providing protection and remedies against unlawful searches and 
seizures"); Tracey E. Panek, Search and Seizure in Utah: Recounting the Antipolygamy 
Raids, 62 Utah Historical Quarterly 316, 327-29 (1994) ("Panek, Search and Seizure in 
Utah") (citing to early accounts of warrantless raids by federal authorities); Firmage and 
Mangrum, Zion in the Courts, 7 (1988) (indicating that pioneers strongly supported 
state's rights). "Underlying the abuse of the general warrant was the perversion of the 
prosecutorial function from investigating known crimes to investigating individuals for 
the purpose of finding criminal behavior." Debooy, 2000 UT 32, ]f 26. 
In one colorful description of a warrantless search, the Deseret News Weekly 
described a federal deputy's response when a resident questioned whether the deputy had 
authority to search her home: "Deputy J.W. Franks replied insolently that the only search 
warrant he needed was an axe with which to break in the door." Wallentine, Heeding the 
Calk 276-77 (quoting Deseret News Weekly, Jan. 20, 1886, at 1). And in another 
encounter, the deputy pushed past the resident and "made a complete search of [the] 
premises." I(L The intrusion was only one of many that Utah's early inhabitants 
frequently endured. See id., 276-79; see also Panek, Search and Seizure in Utah, 327 
(stating the newspaper recounted the warrantless raids as "outrages," "carried out without 
even a warrant giving the perpetrators the authority [to search]") (quoting, Deseret News 
Weekly, March 10, 1886). 
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In fact, the drafters of the state constitution, many of whom practiced polygamy, 
were the targets of warrantless searches and were "acutely concerned with providing 
protection and remedies against unlawful searches and seizures." Wallentine, Heeding 
the Call, 279. Consequently, they unanimously passed art. I, sec. 14 without debate. See 
id. at 275. It states the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14. 
Although Utah's provision is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, see U.S. 
Const, amend. IV, Utah's history and the abuses that pioneers suffered as a result of 
federal raids and intrusions lend support to the need for independent state's rights. See, 
*£., DeBooy. 2000 UT 32, ffi[ 12, 26. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[it] will not hesitate to give the Utah 
Constitution a different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the 
rights of this state's citizens. For example, we have held on more than one occasion that 
article I, section 14 provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment 
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, Tf 12 (internal 
citations omitted); see also Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ^ | 34 (recognizing that "Utah's 
search and seizure provisions (which are identical to those in the federal constitution) 
provide ca greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by 
the United States Supreme Court'") (citation omitted); Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 
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13, Tf 11 (stating that in Brake, 2004 UT 95, the Utah Supreme Court relied on state law, 
including cases applying art. I, sec. 14, to recognize a greater expectation of privacy for 
Utah's citizens); Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1240 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating if the Utah 
Supreme Court were to "view its constitutional duty to construe" the state constitution "in 
the exact same manner as the United States Supreme Court construes" the federal 
provisions, "we would violate the spirit and intended effect of Utah constitutional law 
and policy as established by the framers of the Utah Constitution"); Sims v. Collection 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 841 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1992) (stating the Utah 
Supreme Court has "interpreted the search and seizure provision of the Utah Constitution 
differently than the federal courts have characterized the corresponding federal 
provision"); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-18 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that a 
person has a privacy interest in bank records under the state constitution); Larocco, 194 
P.2d at 465 (plurality opinion) (stating the Utah Supreme Court has shown "a willingness 
to diverge from the United States Supreme Court's" analyses under the federal 
constitution) (citing Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984)); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 
1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1998) (stating the Utah Constitution may be given "a somewhat 
different construction" in order to insulate "this state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by federal courts"); State v. 
Hvzh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (refusing to 
assume that the state and federal analyses for search and seizure law are identical); 
Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 485 (Wyo. 1999) (stating the state constitution is a 
"unique document, the supreme law of our state," and that is sufficient reason "that it 
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should be at issue whenever an individual believes a constitutionally guaranteed right has 
been violated"). This Court should depart from a federal analysis in construing 
application of the Utah Constitution in this case. 
(2) Case Law Supports an Interpretation Under Art. I, Sec. 14 that Rejects the 
Federal Analysis. 
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected federal analysis for application of Utah's 
search-and-seizure provision. In Brake, 2004 UT 95, the court rejected the rule in New 
York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), which allowed an officer to reach into a person's car 
for a search on the basis that the person had no expectation of privacy in his vehicle 
identification number. See_ 2004 UT 95, ^  19, 31. The Utah Supreme Court considered 
the rule to be unacceptable; the Class analysis made it "difficult to imagine any 
circumstance where a police officer would not be justified in searching a car's interior 
since it would always be safer for an officer to search the car herself than to ask for non-
visible information, such as a driver's license." Id^ at ^ 29; see also Larocco, 794 P.2d at 
464-65, 470-71 (limiting the application of Class, and ruling that the police officer's act 
in opening the door of the car to inspect the identification number was unreasonable). In 
Thompson, 810 P.2d at 416-20, the Utah Supreme Court relied on art. I, sec. 14, to rule 
that a person had an expectation of privacy in his bank records at a bank, despite a federal 
ruling to the contrary. See_ id/, see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has articulated the standard under art. I, sec. 
14 for the warrantless search of a car. It has ruled that a warrantless search may be 
"allowed only if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist." Sims, 841 P.2d at 8; 
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Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^  25 (stating "[ujnder Utah law, a warrantless automobile search 
requires probable cause and exigent circumstances unless it satisfies traditionally 
recognized justifications of protecting the safety of police or the public or preventing the 
destruction of evidence"); see also State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (stating there must be probable cause and exigent circumstances for a warrantless 
search under art. I, sec. 14). As the plurality in Larocco stated: 
[T]his court will continue to use the concept of expectation of privacy as a suitable 
threshold criterion for determining whether article I, section 14 is applicable. Then 
if article I, section 14 applies, warrantless searches will be permitted only where 
they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect the safety of police or 
the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70; see also, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63. Also, as Justice 
Zimmerman acknowledged, 
[o]nce the threat that the suspect will injure the officers with concealed weapons 
or will destroy evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why the officers 
cannot take the time to secure a warrant. Such a requirement would present little 
impediment to police investigations, especially in light of the ease with which 
warrants can be obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 272 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (footnote and citations omitted); see 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 25 (stating "[t]he danger inherent in traffic stops does not, 
however, justify the warrantless search of the interior of a vehicle"); see also Utah R. 
Crim. P. 40(1) (2009) (allowing for "remotely communicated search warrants"). 
Under the law, the probable-cause and exigent-circumstances inquiry allows an 
officer to search without a warrant where a '"pressing or urgent law enforcement need' 
makes 'the warrantless search . . . objectively reasonable.'" State v. Pur an, 2007 UT 23, 
\1, 156P.3d795 (internal citation omitted). The circumstances must support that a 
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delay in obtaining a search warrant "would risk 'physical harm to the officers or other 
persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, [or] the escape of the suspect." State v. 
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also icL at 18 (stating the '"need for an 
immediate search must be apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh the 
important protection of individual rights provided by the warrant requirement'") (citation 
omitted). The exigency standard does not allow a warrantless search based on the "'mere 
possibility that evidence may be destroyed.'" Duron, 2007 UT 23, Tf 8 (citation omitted). 
Rather, police must believe that the exigency is "sufficiently certain" to justify the 
warrantless conduct. IcL; see also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) (stating a 
seizure is justified if the car is movable, the occupants are alert, and the car contents may 
never be found again). 
Application of the probable-cause and exigent-circumstances standard to the 
warrantless search of a car would provide citizens with more protection from intrusive 
conduct than Belton provides, since Belton "allows the police to search the passenger 
compartment and any containers contained therein even where no such exigency exists." 
White, 669 A.2d at 908 (Montemuro, J., concurring) (stating the Belton rule has no place 
in Pennsylvania law). As a plurality of the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Larocco, 
An increasing number of state courts are relying on an analysis of the search and 
seizure provisions of their own constitutions to expand or maintain constitutional 
protection beyond the scope mandated by the fourth amendment. See, e.g., State 
v. Glass. 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978); State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 467 A.2d 
571 (1983); People v. Class. 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313, 
on remand from New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 
(1986); State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982); State v. Opyerman, 
247N.W.2d673(S.D.1976). 
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Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465. 
Indeed, other states rejecting the Belton rule have returned to the notion that a 
citizen has a right to privacy in his personal effects, and the government is not at liberty 
to search those effects, but rather may do so only with a warrant or if the search is 
justified due to probable cause and the exigencies of the circumstances. (See supra, pp. 
12-15, identifying jurisdictions that have rejected Belton). In Camacho, the court ruled 
that the Nevada Constitution required both probable cause and exigent circumstances for 
a "warrantless search of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest." 75 P.3d at 
373-74. In that case, officers had probable cause to believe that defendant had drugs in 
his vehicle, however, they lacked exigent circumstances since defendant was handcuffed 
and removed from his vehicle, thereby obviating the need to conduct a warrantless 
search. Id. at 374. In rejecting the Belton rule, the court expressed skepticism that such a 
rule would needlessly tempt police officers "to arrest a person simply to conduct a 
warrantless search of that person's vehicle." IcL at 374. 
In Eckel, the court rejected Belton and relied on the New Jersey Constitution to 
state that "[o]nce the occupant of a vehicle has been arrested, removed and secured 
elsewhere, the considerations informing the search incident to arrest exception are absent 
and the exception is inapplicable." 888 A.2d at 1277 (recognizing that "'[o]ccupants are 
almost invariably removed before an automobile is searched'") (citation omitted). In 
Rowelh the court remained true to the "doctrinal foundations" of its "State constitutional 
jurisprudence" and rejected the Belton analysis, stating, "a search of an automobile under 
the New Mexico Constitution could not reasonably be condoned unless the area searched 
was at that time within the range of the arrestee's potential ability to access any weapons, 
evidence or means of escape." 188 P.3d at 100-01 (emphasis added). Also, it stated that 
New Mexico's "search incident to arrest exception is a rule of reasonableness anchored in 
the specific circumstances facing an officer." IcL at 101; see also State v. Gomez, 932 
P.2d 1, 12-13 (N.M. 1997) (defining exigent circumstances as requiring "swift action to 
prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the 
imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence"; relying on the state constitution 
to reject the federal bright-line rule). 
Itl Commonwealth v. Gelineau, the court recognized that art. I, sec. 8 of the state 
constitution provides more protection for Pennsylvania's citizens than the federal courts 
provide under the federal constitution. 696 A.2d 188, 195 (Pa. Super. 1997) (stating the 
purpose of a warrantless search "is to prevent the arrestee from securing a weapon or 
destroying evidence of criminal activity"). It observed that once an occupant is removed 
from the car, "a search of any property not immediately associated with the person of the 
arrestee to their exclusive control is no longer a search incident to arrest." IcL_ 
lit Bauder, the Vermont Supreme Court assessed "whether law-enforcement 
officers may routinely search a motor vehicle without a warrant, after its occupant has 
been arrested, handcuffed, and secured in the back seat of a police cruiser, absent a 
reasonable need to protect the officers' safety or preserve evidence of a crime." 924 A.2d 
at 40. It ruled that "such warrantless searches offend the core values underlying the right 
to be tree from unreasonable searches and seizures embodied in Chapter I, Article 11 of 
the Vermont Constitution." Id. at 41. 
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And in Hohnan, the Wyoming court recognized that the defendant was arrested, 
handcuffed, and placed in a police car with back-up forces present when officers searched 
the car. 183 P.3d at 370. In that instance, the warrantless search would not be upheld 
under the state constitution unless the circumstances supported that evidence would be 
destroyed or officer safety was at risk. 183 P.3d at 374; see also Toole, 448 N.E.2d at 
1266-68 (relying on Massachusetts law and stating the government made no showing that 
officers searched the vehicle for evidence relating to outstanding warrants for assault and 
battery, the government made no showing that prior to the search officers reasonably 
believed there was a connection between the vehicle and criminal activity, and the 
government made no showing that the officers feared for their safety; also invalidating a 
search of the car where the arrestee was handcuffed and in custody at the time of the 
search); Torres, 543 N.E.2d at 64-65 (relying on a state constitutional analysis in New 
York and recognizing dissatisfaction with the Belton rule). 
In short, the Utah Supreme Court and courts in other jurisdictions have relied on 
established principles for an exception to the warrant requirement under a state 
constitutional analysis. Those principles require the government to show probable cause 
and exigent circumstances for the warrantless conduct. In addition, courts have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Belton bright-line rule since it defies the traditional 
case-by-case assessment of the circumstances facing the officer. Where federal juris-
prudence has failed to anchor the Belton exception in traditional search-and-seizure 
principles to protect an individual's privacy rights, this Court may adopt a separate 
analysis under the state constitution to ensure those rights. 
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Policy Considerations Support a Standard for Warrantless Searches that 
Assesses the Total Circumstances for Reasonableness. 
T# the extent Belton was crafted as part of the Chimel justification to ensure 
officer safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence, the risks to safety and evidence 
may be eliminated when a person is removed from his vehicle to a location secured by 
officers. See, e.g., Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627 (Scalia & Ginsberg, JJ., concurring) 
(stating "[t]he risk that a suspect handcuffed in the back of a squad car might escape and 
recover a weapon from his vehicle is surely no greater than the risk that a suspect 
handcuffed in his residence might escape and recover a weapon from the next room - a 
danger we held insufficient to justify a search in Chimel") (citation omitted); see also 
State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ [ 22, 78 P.3d 590 (stating "the inherent dangerousness of 
all traffic stops is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances" and "this 
danger can be fully or partially mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the vehicle"); 
Pierce, 642 A.2d at 960 (stating when aq arrestee is handcuffed, placed in the patrol car, 
and frisked, "the officer's justification for searching the vehicle . . . is minimal"). 
II State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, the Utah Supreme Court discussed mitigating the 
dangers that officers face in traffic stops. Although the court relied on Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence for the analysis, the discussion in Warren is relevant here. 
Specifically, the court refused to accept a bright-line rule that would subject occupants of 
a vehicle to an automatic frisk for weapons during a traffic stop. See 2003 UT 36, ^ f 1. 
Instead, it relied on a traditional case-by-case analysis and the total circumstances facing 
the officer to determine whether the warrantless conduct was reasonable and justified. 
( * 
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According to the facts, an officer initiated a traffic stop at 4:45 a.m. after he 
observed a person lean into Warren's car to talk to him, and after Warren turned left and 
made a lane change without signaling. IcL at ^ 3-4. During the stop, the officer learned 
that Warren did not have a valid license. He decided to impound the car, although he did 
not intend to arrest Warren. IcL at \ 5. The officer asked Warren to step out of the car, 
and he performed a frisk for weapons "as a matter of routine." IcL at \ 6 (stating the 
officer did not have reason to believe Warren was armed and he was not concerned for 
safety). "During the frisk, a small white twist, later identified as cocaine," fell from 
Warren's sweatshirt. IcL at |^ 7. The officer arrested Warren and during a more thorough 
search of him and the car, the officer discovered more drugs, paraphernalia and a 
weapon. IcL The State charged Warren with several offenses, and after conviction, he 
appealed. K at ^ 8-9. 
In its review, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that traffic stops are inherently 
dangerous. IcL at \ 23. It stated that the dangers are "directly tied to a person's 
occupancy of, and potential access to, the vehicle." I(L at f^ 26. A vehicle presents 
"unknowns." IcL It has "hidden compartments and the potential to hide the suspect's 
actions from the officer's view." IcL at f^ 26. If an officer orders a person out of a 
vehicle, "some or all of the inherent dangerousness of a traffic stop may be mitigated." 
IcL at Tf 27. The "'face-to-face confrontation diminishes the possibility, otherwise 
substantial, that the driver can make unobserved movements; this in turn, reduces the 
likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an assault.'" IcL at f^ 27. (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Mirnms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977)). Also, "'[ojutside the car, the 
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[person],,will be denied access to any possible weapon that might be concealed in the 
xvS^r sffop^mger compartment™: M at ^2? [quotingMaryfo/id v. Wtfsov. 519 
U.S. 408, 414 (1997)). It stands to reason that a person outside the car likewise will not 
have access to evidence in the car for tmrooses of destrovW it 
The court cautioned that removing a person from a car may'not "eliminate all 
danger""rnherent in a traffic stop. M at f 28. It recognized that in some cases, a person 
outside the vehicle "may still gain access to a vehicle" (or items in the vehicle) before the 
officer has completed the purpose for the stop. Id at f 2S. Notwithstanding that 
possibility the court refused to rule that the "inherent d^ngerousness of a traffic stop 
i&Xsm? ^^>ul<l be sufficient to support warrantless eondu^ /a7, at f 29. Rather it is "a 
factor to b e considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis." See, e.g., id at f 22. 
Likewise, " a n y reduction in that danger resulting from Ordering the occupants out of the 
vehicle shouid be factored into the totality of the circurnstances analysis." Id. 
Th^ Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Warren recQgnizes that certain police 
practices vill mitigate the dangers oi a tramc stop, ana hence, the" need for bright-line 
rules. Otl\er courts have recognized the same in the Bekon context. See State v. Gant, 
162 P.3d §40, 643 (Ariz. 2007) (reiving on a federal an^ y s i s a nd m i i n g that when the 
arrestees are securecf m the 6ac£ of separate patrol" cars Vith officers standing 6y, Beiton 
is inapplicable since security measures obviate the need to conduct a warrantless search 
of the car), cert, granted in vart. 128 S.Ct. 1443 (2008); Ferr ell v. State, 649 So.2d 831, 
833 (Miss. 1995) (reiving on a federal analysis ana stating
 a search incident to arrest "is 
foundea u p o n the reasonable concern that the arrestee rrught have a weapon on his person 
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or within his reach" or he may attempt to destroy evidence, "which is within his grasp"; 
and ruling the search of the arrestee's car could not be justified since he "had already 
been frisked, handcuffed," and secured in the back of the officer's car). If common police 
practices require officers to routinely handcuff arrestees and place them in the back of the 
squad car, those circumstances will obviate the need for an automatic warrantless search 
of the car. The search in that instance "cannot be justified as necessary to protect the 
officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of evidence." Gant, 162 P.3d at 644. 
In addition, modern technology - including the use of cell phones and procedures 
for obtaining an on-the-spot warrant from a magistrate with use of electronics- is relevant 
to the analysis. Utah R. Crim. P. 40(1) (2009). Under Utah law, the availability of a 
telephonic warrant is a factor in the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the 
time of the warrantless search. See, e.g., Larocco, 19 A P.2d at 470 (stating "[t]he amount 
of time necessary to obtain a warrant" has been a factor in determining exigent 
circumstances); Hygh, 711 P.2d at 272 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (referencing the 
telephonic- warrant provisions); City of Or em v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1391-92 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (identifying relevant facts to consider in assessing the exigency of the 
circumstances, including, "the availability of a telephonic warrant"); State v. Northrup, 
756 P.2d 1288, 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating "[a]t a minimum, officers could have 
obtained a telephone warrant" pursuant to Utah law). While modern technology alone 
may not obviate an exigency presented in a particular case, it is a factor in the totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis, where reasonableness is the guiding principle and each case 
is examined based on its own facts. 
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d UNDER A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, OFFICER GRAY'S 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE CAR LACKED JUSTIFICATION. 
Officer Gray initiated a traffic stop after he observed Brower make a left-hand turn 
without signaling. (R. 127:PH:5; 127:FMS:10). During the stop, Brower was cooperative 
and compliant. Officer Gray learned that Brower did not own the car, but had permission 
from the owner to drive it. (R. 127:PH:6; 127:FMS: 11). Also, he engaged in a computer 
check and discovered that Brower had outstanding felony warrants. (See R. 127:PH:7; 
127:FMS: 11; see also R. 113Presentence Report at 2 (stating Brower had an outstanding 
warrant for possession of a forged writing device and a federal warrant for a probation 
violation)). Gray asked Brower to step out of the vehicle. He searched her, placed hand-
cuffs on her, and placed her in the back seat of his car. (R. 127:PH:16; 127:FMS:12, 17). 
Officer Kent was at the scene to ensure security. (R. 127:PH:12 (stating a supervisor was 
also at tie scene); 127:FMS:12, 14-15). 
While Brower remained secured in the Dolice cruiser. Grav searched the interior of 
Brower's car and two purses on the passenger's seat. (R. 127:PH:17-18; 127:FMS:12-
13). The search was a matter of routine for "items or evidence of contraband." (R. 
127:PH:17; 127:FMS:12-13). Gray did not articulate probable cause to believe that he 
may find evidence of crime in the car; and he did not articulate exigent circumstances for 
the searcn. (See, generally^ R. 127:PH; 127:FMS). He did not claim that any delay in 
searching the vehicle would compromise police safety or lead to escape or the destruction 
of evidence. (See, generally* R. 127:PH; 127:FMS). Moreover, he did not claim to 
search the car for additional evidence relating either to the traffic violation or to the 
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outstanding warrants. (See, generally, R. 127:PH; 127:FMS). During the search, Gray 
seized a contact-lens container with a crystal substance and a plastic baggie with a green 
leafy substance. (SeeR. 1-3; 127:PH:19-21). 
In the event this Court were to reject the Belton rule for a separate analysis under 
the Utah Constitution that parallels ChimeU the search in this case lacked justification. 
See ChimeU 395 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that a search without a warrant as an incident to 
arrest is a strictly limited right that '"grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation 
at the time of the arrest. But there must be something more in the way of necessity than 
merely a lawful arrest'") (citation omitted); see also Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ 25 (stating a 
warrantless search under Utah law requires probable cause and exigent circumstances 
where it is justified to protect safety or to prevent the destruction of evidence); Warren, 
2003 UT 36, Tf 27 (stating when an officer orders a person out of a vehicle, "some or all 
of the inherent dangerousness of a traffic stop may be mitigated"); Sims, 841 P.2d at 8 
(stating "an expectation of privacy continues to be the threshold criterion" under art. I, 
sec. 14; and the warrantless search of a vehicle may be allowed "if probable cause and 
exigent circumstances exist") (citation omitted); Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70 (stating 
"warrantless searches will be permitted only where they satisfy their traditional 
justification, namely, to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the 
destruction of evidence"); Morck, 821 P.2d at 1193 (stating "[u]nder Article I, Section 
14, there must be exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless automobile search"); 
(supra, Parts B.(2), B.(3), herein). 
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Tpe officer lacked probable cause to believe that he may find evidence of crime in 
the car; he was not concerned for safety or the preservation of evidence when he engaged 
in the warrantless search; and he did indicate that he believed the car harbored evidence 
relating to the traffic stop or the warrants outstanding for Brower's arrest. (See, 
generally, R. 127:PH; 127:FMS). Indeed, the officer secured Brower in a police cruiser 
thereby mitigating any danger that may have been inherent in the stop. See, e.g., Warren, 
2003 UT 36, If 27 (stating the dangerousness of a traffic stop is mitigated when the officer 
orders the occupants from the car). In addition, the officer gave no indication that he 
attempted to secure a warrant by electronic means or otherwise; and he did not attempt to 
justify the search under some other exception to the warrant requirement. (See, 
generally, R. 127:PH; 127:FMS; see also R. 127:FMS:5). For example, he did not seek 
consent to search from Brower; he did not seek consent from the owner of the car; he did 
not intend to impound or inventory the vehicle; and he did not claim that evidence of 
contraband was in plain view. (See, generally, R. 127:PH; 127:FMS). 
The Utah Supreme Court "will continue to use the concept "of expectation of 
privacy as a suitable threshold criterion for determining whether article I, section 14 is 
applicable." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70; see also White, 669 A.2d at 902 (stating the 
Pennsylvania court has emphasized the privacy interests inherent in the state constitution, 
while the "United States Supreme Court has deemphasized" privacy interests). To ensure 
that state constitutional jurisprudence remains "true to its doctrinal foundations," Rowell, 
188 P.3d at 100, this Court should reject warrantless conduct that fails to take into 
considdration a citizen's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See. 
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Utah Const, art. I, sec. 14; (supra. Part B.(2), herein). It should reaffirm "the continued 
viability of the time-honored totality of the circumstances analysis," Rowell, 188 P.3d at 
101, for the reasonableness assessment under the state constitution. Reasonableness 
requires a case-by-case analysis of the total circumstances facing the officer at the time of 
the search in order that the search may be reviewed for probable cause and exigent 
circumstances—two concepts familiar to every officer in the line of duty. Any other 
assessment would allow an officer carte blanche authority to search a person's effects 
without a warrant and without justification; such a rule should be foreign to search-and-
seizure jurisprudence founded on a warrant requirement and reasonableness. See_ Utah 
Const, art. I, sec. 14; see also Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 31 (stating courts have 
"consistently eschew[ed] bright-line rules" in favor of "the fact-specific nature of the 
reasonableness inquiry") (citation omitted). In this case, Officer Gray's warrantless 
search of the car was unjustified and unlawful under a state constitutional analysis. 
Brower respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court ruling on the matter. 
D. FINALLY, THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN GIRON IS NOT 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY FOR THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
RAISED IN BROWER'S CASE. 
The trial court relied on State v Giron as controlling authority to reject Brower's 
claims under the state constitution. (R. 89 (citing Giron, 943 P.2d 1114)). Yet Giron is 
not dispositive of the issues raised here. In Giron, Officers Bench and Ruth initiated a 
traffic stop after they observed defendant make an improper U-turn. Set? 943 P.2d at 
1115. During the stop, Giron produced an identification card, while his passenger got out 
of the car, discarded "what appeared to be narcotics," and walked away. IcL_ Officer Ruth 
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pursued the passenger, and as Bench left to help, he told Giron to wait. IcL Instead, 
Giron "drove away, squealing his tires." IdL The officers apprehended the passenger and 
later conducted a records check on Giron and learned that his license was suspended. See_ 
id. Based on that violation and his failure earlier to follow a police command, they went 
to his home, and found no one there. Id. Shortly after leaving the residence, the officers 
saw Giron's vehicle and again signaled Aim to stop. IdL Giron coiltinued to drive another 
block to park across the street from his house. IdL The officers immediately arrested 
him, placed him in handcuffs in the patrol car, and impounded his vehicle. IcL at 1115-16. 
Tfie officers then conducted an inventory search. IcL at 1116. "Officer Bench 
found cocaine under the driver's seat, a syringe between the driver's seat and the console, 
another syringe and a knife under the passenger seat, spoons on the back seat floor, a set 
of scales in a garbage bag on the back seat, and several empty plastic baggies throughout 
the interior of the car." IdL The State charged Giron with possession of contraband, and 
Giron imturn challenged the justification for the warrantless search. See_ id. at 1115. 
I | trial court proceedings, the State maintained that the search was justified in part 
as incident to arrest. IdL at 1116. The trial court disagreed, and the State appealed. See 
id. In its filings with the Court of Appeals, the State relied on federal jurisprudence and 
focused on whether the arrest was lawful, whether the search was conducted in an area 
within the arrestee's immediate control, and whether the search took place as an act 
contemporaneous to the arrest. M at 1118 (citing, inter alia, New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454 (1981): Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). The Court of Appeals 
reviewed the issue and considered the trial court analysis to be incomplete. It remanded 
the case for further proceedings under the Fourth Amendment. IcL at 1120, 1121 
(remanding for trial court findings on temporal proximity). 
The Court of Appeals then turned to Giron's argument that "article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution provides greater protection than that afforded" under the Fourth 
Amendment. IcL at 1120. It declined to address the issue on the grounds that it lacked 
binding precedential authority. 7^ at 1121 . In addition, the Court of Appeals relied on 
Utah cases, which applied the federal standard to the issue. See_ id_ at 1121 & n. 4 (citing 
InreK.K.C, 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981); State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996)): see also K.K.C., 636 P.2d at 1046 (recog-
nizing that the defendant cited to art. I, sec. 14; yet analyzing the issue only under the 
federal Belton standard); Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247 (relying on a federal analysis). 
Since Giron fails to contain meaningful discussion for a state constitutional analy-
sis, it is not dispositive of the issues here. See Giron, 943 P.2d at 1120-21. At best, the 
Giron decision may be read "to have disposed of a frivolous constitutional claim or what 
may have been a potentially meritorious constitutional claim that was presented in a 
frivolous manner." Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 1989). 
The court in Giron did not address whether the historical basis for the Utah Constitution 
affords greater protections for its citizens, whether new developments in state law war-
rant an examination of the issue, or whether recent developments in other jurisdictions 
provide persuasive support for rejecting the Belton rule in this state. In that regard, the 
ruling in Giron has "little persuasive effect" on the state constitutional issues raised in 
Brewer's case. See Horton, 785 P.2d at 1090. It is irrelevant and should be rejected. 
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CONCLUSION 
Brower respectfully requests that this Court reverse the triaTcourt'S ruling under 
art. I, sec. 14 of the Utah. Constitution on the basis that the warrantless search was 
unlawful 
SUBMITTED this ° ^ day of Apn 1 ,2009. 
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UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 14 
SecJ 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
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DEBORAH GAYE BROWER, 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 071907055 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
|^1 The State has charged the defendant, Deborah Brower, with two counts of the 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, both 3rd degree felonies, and one count of driving on 
a denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked license, a class C misdemeanor. Brower asks mej "to 
suppress all evidence-including her statements-resulting from the search of the vehicle... [she] was 
driving." Motion to Suppress, p. 1. 
\2 More specifically, Brower asks me to hold that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution "affords greater protection to those subjected to seizures and searches" than that 
outlined by the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Based on Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution., p. 2. This I cannot do. 
1|3 In State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1997), the Utah Court of Appeals 
rejected the argument Brower advances here. Therefore, I must deny Brower's motion to suppress. 
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